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The purpose of this paper is to study the empirical strength  of the bi-directional linkages 
between environmental standards and performance, on the one hand, and environmental 
innovation, on the other and, hence, the role of policy in spurring environmental R&D 
and, in turn, ultimate environmental performance. We study these links using an 
alternative measure of policy stringency, namely, pollutant emissions themselves. 
Specifically, we examine 107 manufacturing industries at the three-digit SIC code for the 
period 1989  - 2002. In view of the joint determination of r esearch and pollution 
outcomes, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations, using appropriate instruments 
to identify each endogenous variable. Our empirical results reveal that there is a negative 
and significant relationship between emissions and environmental patents, in both 
directions. Thus, environmental R&D both spurs the tightening of government 
environmental standards and is spurred by the anticipation of such tightening, suggesting 
that U.S. environmental policy (at least in the context of the manufacturing industries that 
we study) has been responsive to innovation and effective in inducing innovation. 
Preliminary results also suggest that a linear feedback model is appropriate in order to 
capture the dynamic nature of the links between environmental policy and environmental 
innovation. 
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  Innovation in environmental technologies has long been considered the driving 
force behind pollution reduction (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Jaffe, et al., 2002).  Like 
R&D in other areas, environmental R&D is driven by the prospective economic gains 
that new technologies can deliver in cost savings or revenue generation.  Unlike many 
other realms of innovative investment, however, the economic gains from new 
environmental technologies are largely determined by government environmental policy.  
For example, if government standards for allowable pollutant emissions are tightened, 
costs of meeting these standards rise (ceteris paribus) and the prospective cost savings 
from new environmental technologies rise in tandem, spurring new innovation.   
  In a growing literature, economists have studied the links between different 
environmental policy instruments and innovation incentives on a theoretical level, 
comparing emission taxes, marketable permits, technology mandates and performance 
standards, with and without technology spillovers and patent protections (see Fischer, et 
al., 2003).  In this literature, the government is typically modeled as a first-mover, 
committing to a given setting of a given regulatory instrument and allowing innovation to 
respond accordingly.  The government may consider the effect of its policy standard on 
innovation; for example, it may set a seemingly ambitious pollutant standard in order to 
spur environmental R&D.  Alternately, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that 
government environmental policy  responds to environmental innovation, often w ith 
requirements for adoption of the “best available control technology” (Jaffe, et al., 2002).  
Such responsive policies also provide strong incentives for environmental innovation, as 
they offer successful innovators a “ready market” for their products ( Jaffe, et al., 2002).  
Innes and Bial (2002) study such responsive policies in an imperfectly competitive 
market setting, showing how flexible emission taxes and standards can be combined to 
elicit both optimal pollution levels and optimal environmental R&D. 
  With responsive policies, there are bi-directional links between environmental 
standards and performance, on the one hand, and environmental innovation, on the other.  
Pollutant emissions and environmental R&D are jointly determined as successful R&D   4
prompts policy change and attendant pollution reductions, and as anticipated policy 
change (and attendant tightening of pollution standards) spurs new R&D.   
The purpose of this paper is to study the empirical strength of these bi-directional 
linkages and,  hence, the role of policy in spurring environmental R&D and, in turn, 
ultimate environmental performance.  We study these links using an alternative measure 
of policy stringency, namely, pollutant emissions themselves
2.  Specifically, w e examine 
107 manufacturing industries at the three-digit SIC code for the period 1989 - 2002. The 
change in environmental technology, as measured by the number of patents,  is assumed 
to drive changes in effective environmental standards, which in turn drive observed 
emissions. On the other hand, emissions proxy for the changes in standards that drive 
environmental R&D and, hence, resulting patents.  In view of the joint determination of 
research and pollution outcomes, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations,  using 
appropriate  instruments  to identify each endogenous variable. Our empirical results 
reveal that  there is a negative and significant relationship between emissions and 
environmental patents, in both directions. Thus, environmental R&D both spurs the 
tightening  of government environmental standards and is spurred by the anticipation of 
such tightening, suggesting that U.S. environmental policy (at least in the context of the 
manufacturing industries that we study) has been responsive to innovation and effective 
in inducing innovation.   Preliminary results  also  suggest that a linear feedback model  is 
appropriate in order to capture the dynamic nature of the links between environmental 
policy and environmental innovation. 
This paper contributes to  a surprisingly small empirical literature on 
environmental innovation.   This literature focuses on the effects of pollution abatement 
expenditures (PAE) on innovative activity.  In doing so, scholars have sought to test the 
“induced innovation” hypothesis.  The latter hypothesis posits that higher pollution 
abatement costs, costs that can be reduced by innovative success, spur more innovative 
activity (ceteris paribus).    Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find evidence for this hypothesis  in 
using  U.S.  industry-level  panel  data on total (environmental and non-environmental) 
R&D expenditures and patent counts.   Lanjouw and Mody (1993) also find informal 
evidence that environmental innovation is induced by higher PAE, presenting tabular data 
                                                 
2 Implicitly we are assuming that pollutant emissions are always at the maximum permissible level.    5
on environmental patents and control costs from the U.S., Germany and Japan.  
Brunnermeir and Cohen (2003) are the first to estimate a model that links PAE to U.S. 
environmental patent counts, again finding evidence in support of the induced innovation 
hypothesis. 
Our work differs from previous studies primarily because we study a model of bi-
directional links between environmental policy and environmental R&D that explicitly 
accounts for the joint determination of these outcomes.  In doing so, we use what we 
consider to be a more direct measure of policy stringency, emissions as opposed to PAE.  
This focus permits us to infer interactions between policy, innovation, and pollution that 
are not possible in the existing uni-directional studies of PAE effects on patent counts 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present 
the conceptual framework relating emissions and number of patents. Section 3 details 
data and variables used in our analysis.  Section 4 highlights some estimation issues that 
need to be considered.  Our empirical findings are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 




Our objective is to study empirical linkages between environmental research and 
development, on the one hand, and environmental policy on the other.  In our data, 
observable outcomes of environmental R&D are environmental patents, and observable 
outcomes of environmental policy are emissions per-unit-output (as measured by the ratio 
of emissions to the real value of sales).  Specifically, we envision an underlying structural 
model that determines four outcomes, our two observables (emissions and patents) and 
two unobservables (effective environmental standards and environmental R&D).  Let us 
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where  Pit is time t environmental patents in industry  i,  RDit-1 is lagged environmental 
R&D in industry  i,  Qit is the time t change in emissions (per unit sales) in industry  i, Sit 
are environmental standards for industry  i, the  X’s represent exogenous observable 
variables, the eit’s represent random errors, and E represents an expectation operator.  Eq. 
(1) indicates that patent numbers are determined by lagged industry R&D (among other 
variables).  Eq. (2) indicates that emissions reflect changes in environmental standards.  
Eq. (3) indicates that environmental standards are determined (in part) by improvements 
in environmental technology as measured by the number of environmental patents.  
Finally, Eq. (4) indicates that R&D expenditures are determined (in part) by anticipated 
changes in environmental standards.   
Lagging (2) and (3) and then substituting (3) into (2), gives the following 
structural form for emissions: 
*******
1(1) (5)      tqqtqtqqtqqtqstqt QabQcPdXeXfX ? ?? ???????  
Intuitively, the change in environmental technology, as measured by the number 
of patents, drives changes in effective environmental standards, which in turn drive 
observed emissions.  The key parameter of interest in the resulting Eq. (5) is bq
*, which 
incorporates the effects of patents on standards (bs).   
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Intuitively, emissions proxy for the changes in standards that drive environmental 
R&D and, hence, resulting patents. The key parameter of interest in equation (6) is bp
*, 
which incorporates the effects of policy changes ( Sit) on environmental R&D ( br).  In 
sum, estimating Eq. (5) tests for effects of R&D on environmental policy, and estimating 
Eq. (6) tests for effects of environmental policy on environmental R&D.  Note that Eq. 
(5) is identified by  Xit, which incorporates determinants of changes in “effective 
standards,”  Sit.  As discussed below, key among such determinants are government 
enforcement activity that increases the stringency of environmental regulations.  Eq. (6),   7
in turn, is identified by  Xpt and  Xr(t-1), those variables that drive research and patent 
outcomes. 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We  construct a panel of 107 manufacturing industries (SIC codes 20-39) for the 
period 1989  - 2002. Our data comes from a number of sources. Emissions data are 
available from two sources, the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and the EPA's Air 
Office. Using the TRI, we construct industry level total toxic releases (by aggregated 
weight) by year from 1989 to 2002. Facility releases reported in the TRI are assigned to 
the primary industry of the parent company. Data from the EPA's Air Office gives us 
industry level releases of criteria air pollutants from 1995 to 2001. We perform 
estimations using appropriate panels for both sets of emissions data. 
Using a dataset from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, we construct 
successful patent application counts by year, by industry, environmental and non-
environmental, for U.S. and foreign companies
3. Environmental patents are determined 
by patent classifications that relate to air or water pollution, hazardous waste prevention, 
disposal and control, recycling and alternative energy. We determined the SIC industry to 
which each of these patents belonged to using the primary line of business of the 
organization that is named first on the patent application
4. 
Financial data is obtained from Compustat and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Deflators are obtained using producer price indexes reported in the Economic 
Report of the President (2004). Compustat is composed of three datasets, which contains 
information on about 1500 of the largest industrial companies, 2500 smaller industrial 
companies, and companies dropped after major events, such as bankruptcies, mergers and 
                                                 
3 The literature suggests that it is preferable to count them by date of application rather than by date of 
grant, because that is the time at which the inventor perceives that he or she has made a potentially valuable 
invention, and the lag between application and grant is somewhat variable and affected by the vagaries of 
the patent office operations. The average lag between application and grant was 2 years. 
4 It is important to clarify that there will be some misclassification if an organization is granted a patent for 
a product or process different from its primary line of business. Unfortunately for our case, the patent 
Office does not ask applicants to identify themselves by industry, and there is no documentation to 
aggregate patent data to the industry level in a better way. Also, note that this classification has been used 
by previous studies, such as Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003), Jaffe and Palmer (1997).   8
liquidators. 
Environmental inspection, compliance and enforcement data is culled from the 
EPA's IDEA dataset. The IDEA dataset is a facility level data that incorporates data from 
the Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) Facility Subsystem (AFS), the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and the National program 
management and inventory system of RCRA hazardous waste handlers. AFS contains 
compliance a nd enforcement data on stationary sources of air pollution. Regulated 
sources cover a wide spectrum; from large industrial facilities to relative small 
operations. IDEA includes data on non-federally reportable facilities, including facilities 
that operate seasonally, temporally shut down, and shut down. However, IDEA does not 
include facilities that are solely asbestos demolition and/or renovation contractors, or 
landfills. 
In our emissions equation (5), the dependent variable is the industry emission 
level (as a ratio of real sales).  Emission level  consists of toxic releases reported at the 
facility level in the TRI. Total emissions are reported in pounds for all chemicals released 
in the air, water, landfills and waste
5. 
Exogenous regressors are lagged U.S. environmental patents; measures of 
industry concentration (such as the Herfindahl index
6 )  at the 3 -digit SIC code,  capital 
intensity is calculated dividing  new capital expenditures by  real sales,  age of capital is 
calculated dividing total assets by gross assets. Age of capital should be between zero and 
one,  a  higher ratio means (closer to one) newer assets. E xport intensity (the ratio of 
export-related sales to real sales); scope (equals to one if the industry has R&D programs 
over 500,000) and measures of regulatory scrutiny (lagged U.S. industry environmental 
inspections, number of visits with sampling and the number of enforcement actions over 
the prior year). Environmental enforcement activity is widely cited as a stimulus to 
pollution abatement (e.g., Magat and Viscusi (1990), Gray and Deily (1996), Laplante 
and Rilstone (1996), Nadeau (1997)). However, there is no evidence, in theory or 
                                                 
5 Note the TRI des not have some SIC codes that are present in the patent dataset. These observations 
should be considered as missing observations since it is not feasible that these SIC have zero emissions. 
The emission sample includes 0.03 % of observations that are in patent but not in emissions. These 
observations are deleted form the sample. Therefore we should expect biased estimates but the percentage 
is so small that we should not be concerned.   9
empirical work, that enforcement activity affects innovative activity; indeed, in testing 
for such effects, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find none of significance. We therefore 
use measures of enforcement activity as identifying instruments in our emission 
equation
7. 
In our patent equation (6), the dependent variable is the number of U.S. successful 
environmental p atents applications by U.S. companies by industry (as defined by three-
digit SIC class)
8.  Patents were classified environmental or non-environmental by year 
granted by industry. This classification of environmental and non-environmental is 
according to the list constructed using patent class. Exogenous regressors are measures of 
industry concentration, capital intensity, export intensity, scope, foreign patents (the 
number of U.S. patents by foreign companies), and U.S. non-environmental patents (the 
number of U.S. non-environmental patents by U.S. companies). There is debate in the 
literature on potential effects of industry concentration, size and capital intensity on 
innovative activity. Industries more sensitive to exports may also be more sensitive to 
green consumerism abroad; including the export intensity regressor controls for such 
effects on environmental R&D. The last two patent variables provide useful instruments 
for our patent equation; U.S. environmental patent activity for a given industry is l ikely to 
be correlated with corresponding foreign patent activity (see Jaffe and Palmer (1997), for 
example) and innovative activity in non-environmental technologies, while the latter 
instruments are unlikely to be driven by U.S. environmental policy or performance . 
Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value 
across all industries and years, for each variable used in the analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Other indicators such as the 4-firm concentration ratio and the number of small firms in the industry were 
also considered. 
7 The simple correlation coefficients between emission per output and the number of actions, inspections 
and visits are 0.27, 0.34 and 0.22 respectively. 
8 In this case we also have a mismatch between emissions and patents, specifically there are some SIC 
codes present in the emission dataset but missing from the patent dataset. In this case, it is reasonable to 
believe that the SIC code missing from the patent dataset refers to zero patents. Another potential problem 
we face when dividing the patent sample is that there might be some patents that are counted as non-
environmental when in reality they might be. This is a risk we will have to take because it is not possible to 
examine each patent individually. We have to believe that out environmental patent classification is 
exhaustive.   10
 
Table1. Summary Statistics 
 
  Regression Sample, N= 103 T=14 
Variables  Measurement  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
VISISTS  Number  34.40  113.05  0  1655 
INSP  Number  29.65  41.03  0  332 
ACTIONS  Number  27.65  63.89  0  793 
R&D EXP  Million Dollars  2.638  5.709  0  54.12 
REEXPORT  Percent  0.34  1.85  0  30.72596 
REKAPINT  Percent  0.80  3.97  0.066  120.40 
SIZE  Dummy  0.43  0.50  0  1 
SCOPE  Dummy  0.50  0.27  0  1 
HHI4  Ratio  0.11  0.25  0  0.98 
USENV  Number  104.11  274.15  0  2657 
EMISSION  Ratio  76.19  159.19  0.0003  1743.52 
AGE  Ratio  1.31  0.81  0.4828  27.86 
USNON  Number  114.72  285.35  0  2281 




Empirical Model and Moment Conditions 
 
Because patents take a count form, we should use an econometric model that 
takes in account the nature of patents. In addition, since equations (5) and (6) are 
simultaneous equations, the estimation method must also account for endogeneity. We 
apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Windmeijer 
and Santos-Silva (1997) for count data models with endogenous regressors. 
From our previous notation,  Pit  denotes the count of patents for which the 
conditional mean is specified as
9: 






where  Xi,  is a   k-dimensional vector of explanatory variables and  ? is a  k-dimensional 
vector of parameters. If a probability density function like Poisson or a negative binomial 
distribution is assumed, the coefficients can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The conditional mean specification of (7) implicitly defines a regression model: 
? ? ? ? (8)     expexp iiiiiiiiii pxx ?????????
?? ???????  
where  ?i ? exp??i?  and  ?i  are multiplicative and additive error terms, reflecting   11
unobserved heterogeneity between industries. If some of the elements of  xi  are 
endogenous, the Poisson model will be inconsistent because either  E??i|xi?? 1  or  
E??i|xi?? 0 . Windmeijer and Santos-Silva (1997) derive GMM estimators for both 
specifications of endogeneity. The model with multiplicative error term  ?i  is motivated 
by treating the observables  xi  and unobservables  ?i  symmetrically. In principle, both 
models are observationally equivalent when only the conditional mean is specified. 
GMM techniques are applicable if instruments  zi   are available, such that  E??i|zi?? 1  
or  E??i|zi?? 0 . Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) indicate that a set of instruments 
can only be orthogonal to either multiplicative or additive errors. This paper only displays 
results from the multiplicative specification, as tests for the over-identifying restrictions 
support this specification. The GMM estimator is based on the residual  ?i ? 1  which is 
equal to  ?pi ? ?i?/?i . The estimator proposed by Windmeijer and Santos-Silva (1997) 
minimizes the objective function 
? ? ? ? ? ?
1 11 (9)      pMZZZZMp ??
? ? ? ??? ? ??? ?  
where  M ? diag??i? ,  Z  is an  N ? g  matrix of instruments
10. 
This is equivalent to a heteroscedasticity corrected objective function, which 
allows for over-dispersion and its minimization will not yield Poisson ML results. 
We treat innovators  ?pi ? 0?  and non-innovators  ?pi ? 0?  identically. 
Therefore, we make the implicit assumption that the observed over-dispersion and excess 
zeros are solely caused by unobserved heterogeneity, and  not by separate probability 
models for zero and non-zero models. Vuong tests of a standard negative binomial model 
versus zero-inflated ones for the number of successful patents applications did not 
support the zero-inflated model. Even though the standard negative binomial model is not 
identical to the multiplicative Poisson model applied in this study, both are similar, in as 
                                                                                                                                                 











?? .  
10 For Eq. (5), we will use measures of enforcement activity as instruments. These instruments are valid due 
to previous empirical evidence that found no relation between enforcement and innovation activities. For 
Eq.(6), we use US non-environmental patents and foreign patents as identifying instruments. Empirical 
evidence suggests that foreign patent activity is correlated with domestic environmental patent activity but 
it will not be driven by US environmental policy.   12
much as both allow for over-dispersion caused by unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, 
the result of the Vuong test supports the chosen multiplicative Poisson GMM approach
11. 
As explained before the count of successful patent applications and the emission 
level are  modeled with a simultaneous equation approach. The number of successful 
patent applications  pi   depends on the level of emissions  ei  and covariates  Xi.   
The emission equation (5) will be estimated using a fixed effects panel data 
model
12. Implicitly, we are assuming that our specification is correct, where the observed 





Our analysis provides evidence that environmental R&D both spurs the tightening of 
government environmental standards and is spurred by the  anticipation of such 
tightening.  
 
Figure 1 describes US environmental patent applications and emission level for the 
period 1989  - 2002. This figure indicates the negative relationship between patents and 
emission level. 
 
                                                 
11 Vuong Test of Zero- Inflated Negative Binomial vs. Neg. Bin: Std. Normal = -5.36 
12 We performed the Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects along with a Hausmann 
specification test. From the B-P LM test we concluded that the classical regression model with a single constant term is 
innappropriate for our data. Moreover, we reject the hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with other 
































































































The number of successful U.S. environmental patent is specified to be conditional 
on industry size, age, capital and export intensity, real R&D expenditures, scope and 
emission level. In the following paragraphs, the results of the patent estimations are 
discussed. In addition to the test for over-identifying restrictions, a test for serial 
correlation is carried out. Table 3 portrays the estimation results for number of patents 
and the emission level as a potential endogenous regressor. The first two columns 
correspond to the Multiplicative Poisson Model (Model 1) where we don't control for 
endogeneity of the variable emission per unit output. Model 2 corresponds to the GMM 
estimation described above. In this case we correct for endogeneity using the lagged 
enforcement measures as instruments. Finally, we consider model 3 where we have a 
linear feedback model. The sign the coefficients remain stable when comparing the 
results from the multiplicative Poisson and the GMM estimation. 
For the Herfindahl index, we find  that its coefficient is negative and significant in 
models (2) and (3), suggesting that innovation is positively related to domestic 
competitiveness. The coefficient in the lagged R&D expenditure is positive and 
significant in model (2) and (3). We expect that under model 2 there is an increase of 2% 
in patents when R&D expenditures increase by $1 million (and other variables are held 
constant). Thus, we can say that the magnitude of the R&D impact on environmental   14
innovation is economically and statistically significant. 
Scope has a negative and significant coefficient for models (2) and (3). This is 
somewhat counter-intuitive because we would expect that those industries with large 
R&D programs would be the most innovative. The coefficient of age is negative and 
significant which means that industries with older capital have an incentive to innovate. 
This consistent with the innovation and pollution abatement costs literature, where we 
find that as pollution abatement cost rises, innovation is a solution to lower costs. 
The positive and significant coefficient in export intensity in models (2) and (3) is 
consistent with previous literature, where it indicates that greener products spur 
environmental innovation. Model (2) shows that an increase of 1% in export intensity 
leads to an increase of 5% in the number of patents. 
As a test for over-identifying restrictions is not rejected the instruments seem to 
be valid. In other words, the restrictions implied by the instruments are accepted. M2 
tests for the second order serial correlation based on the first difference equation, in other 
words, M2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the 1st difference residuals. 
Thus, GMM will be consistent because the assumption of no serial correlation in the error 
is satisfied. 
Emission per unit output is significant only in model (2). This is consistent with 
the idea that tighter standards spur innovation. In the linear feedback model, the negative 
effect of emissions per output has a greater impact than in model (2). This leaves open 
lines of research and explore the dynamic nature of environmental policy and innovation 
   15



















































































































-1.4264  -0.0004 












      Statistic  p-value  Statistic  p-value 
SARGAN TEST  *  *  29.8669  0.2293  20.4322  0.4941 
M1  *  1.0686  0.2853  -0.9682  0.3330  SERIAL 




Now, we discuss the results for the emission equation where emission level per output 
unit is explained by lagged number of visits, inspections and actions. Moreover, the 
number of US environmental successful patent applications, export intensity, capital 
intensity, size and scope and the additional instruments discussed above. Table 3 displays 
the estimation results of t he emission equation, where Model 4 refers to a simple fixed 
effects model that ignores the problem of endogeneity. Model 5 instruments for 
environmental patents. Finally Model 6 introduces a lagged value of emission per unit 
output but is not controlling  for the endogeneity problem between emissions and patents. 
The enforcement variables are negative and highly significant. This is the expected result   16
because we can expect that an increase in enforcement activity is related to a decrease in 
emission per level output. The patent coefficient is model (5) is negative and significant, 
this implies that an increase in innovative activity reduces the levels of emissions. Note 
that in model 6 there is positive relationship between lagged emission per unit output and 
current emissions per output. 
 
































































































































































          Statistic  p-value 
SARGAN TEST  *  *  *  *  49.33  0.6901 
M1  *  *  *  -3.62  0.0003  SERIAL 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between environmental policy and 
environmental innovation. A model was estimated using panel dataset of 103 US 
manufacturing industries at the three digit level from 1989 to 2002. We find that, other 
things held constant, that environmental R&D both spurs the tightening of government 
environmental standards and is spurred by the anticipation of such tightening. Although 
we can speculate the economic magnitude of this relationship, this results should be 
considered as preliminary. Nevertheless, our findings suggest the need for further 
research in understanding the relationship between the environmental innovation process 
and environmental policy. The immediate step is to improve the estimation in the 
emission equation using a more flexible program, such as the one developed by Arellano 
and Bond. Using this program will allow us to control for endogeneity in model (6).   18
References 
  
Arellano M and O Bover (1995) ''Another look at the instrumental variable extimation of 
error-components models.'' Journal of Econometrics. 68(1995) 29-51 
Biglaiser G, Horowitz JK and Quiggin J. (1995) ''Dynamic Pollution Regulation'' Journal 
of Regulatory Economics 8(1995) 33-44 
Bludell R and S Bond (1998) ''Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models .'' Journal of Econometrics. 87(1998) 115-143 
Brunneimer Smita and Mark Cohen. (2003) ''Determinants of environmental innovation 
in US manufactiring industries.'' . 45(2003) 278-293 
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK, Milne F, Piggott J.(1988) '' A microeconometric model of the 
demand for health care and health insurance in Australia.'' Review of Economic 
Studies. 55(1988) 85-106 
Fischer Carolyn, Ian Parry and William Pizer. (2003) ''Instrument choice for 
environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.'' Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 45(2003) 523-545 
Gray W and Deily M. (1996). ''Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in 
the US steel industry .''Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
31(1996) 96-111 
Innes R and Bial JJ (2002) '' Inducing innovation in the environmental technology of 
oligopolistic firms .'' Journal of Industrial Economics 50(2002) 265-287 
Jaffe Adam and Karen Palmer. (1997) ''Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A 
Panel Data Study'' The Review of Economics and Statistics. 4(1997) 610-619 
Lanjouw Jean and Ashoka Mody. (1996) ''Innovation and the international difussion of 
environmentally responsive technology.'' Research Policy. 25(1996) 549-571 
Laplante B And Rilstone P (1996) ''Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp 
and paper industry in Quebec '' Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 31(1996) 19-36 
Magat WA and Viscusi WK (1990) ''Effectiveness of theEPAs regulatory enforcement 
The Case of Industrial effluent Standards.'' Journal of Law and Economics 33(1990) 
331-360 
Nadeau L (1997) '' EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level 
noncompliance .'' Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 34(1997) 
54-78 
Milliman SR, Prince R (1989) ''Firm Incentives to Promote Technological change in 
pollution control.'' Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 17(1989) 
247-265 
Windmeijer FAG and JM Santos Silva. (1997) ''Endogeneity in count dara models: An 
application to demand for health care'' Journal of Applied Econometrics 12 (1997) 
281-294 
Windmeijer F. (2002) ExpEnd, A Gauss Programme for Non-Linear GMM Estimation of 
Exponential Models with Endogenous Regressors for Cross Section and Panel Data. 
(2002) Institute for Fiscla Studies 
 